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Introduction1
The Afghan War left an ambiguous legacy in Tajikistan. In some quar-
ters, it fed religious and nationalist sentiment, acting as a vehicle of wider 
criticisms of Russian-led rule. This was particularly true for underground 
religious circles, where the war was sometimes cast as anti-Islamic (Ro’i, 
2002, pp. 346, 704; Reuveny & Prakash, 1999, p. 704.), but it was also the 
case in certain intellectual groups that increasingly espoused nationalist 
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Afghan War veterans in Tajikistan between 1979 and 1992. In 2013 and 2014, he conducted 
arcСТval anН oral rОsОarcС Тn TajТkТstan. HО СolНs an MA Тn ConlТct StuНТОs anН Human 
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1 The author is indebted to numerous individuals who supported him in his research. He would 
like to give special thanks to his supervisors Jenny Mathers and Ayla Göl at Aberystwyth 
University, Sunatullo Jonboboev at the University of Central Asia in Dushanbe, Bohdan 
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rhetoric in the late Soviet era.2 In other ways, however, the war appears to 
have reinforced Communist power in Tajikistan. With the 1979 invasion, 
the small fringe republic suddenly acquired central strategic importance 
and was in consequence showered with political attention and material 
support from Moscow. Sharing a 1,300 kilometre border with Afghanistan, 
Tajikistan became an advance base for the Soviet intervention and was also 
used to showcase the Soviet model to delegations of visiting Afghans (Roy, 
1997, p. 197).
An ОvОn morО НТrОct Тmpact of tСО аar аas fОlt bв tСО rougСlв iftООn 
thousand Tajik citizens who went to Afghanistan to help sustain the inter-
vОntТon. StrТkТng about tСОsО solНТОrs, oficОrs, ТntОrprОtОrs anН cТvТlТan 
spОcТalТsts Тs tСО ОбtОnt to аСТcС tСОТr ОбpОrТОncОs rОlОctОН аТНОr trОnНs Тn 
Tajikistan. While some of them came to join calls for greater cultural and 
political autonomy for the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic, others returned 
from Afghanistan with a stronger attachment to their Soviet identity and 
a deeper sense of belonging to the state that had sent them to shed blood 
in the mountains and deserts of Afghanistan, promising them glory and 
material reward in return. An important dividing line ran between indivi-
duals who had taken part in the intervention in an advisory capacity and 
tСosО аСo аОnt to AfgСanТstan to fulil a mТlТtarв functТon, as solНТОrs anН 
oficОrs – although there were numerous exceptions.3
The year 1989 offers an interesting snapshot of the different tenden-
cies that played out among the former participants. A pivotal year in many 
ways, it featured both the end of the Afghan intervention and the passing 
of the Law on Language, which proclaimed Tajik (a variant of Persian) 
as the only state language in the republic (Landau & Kellner-Heinkele, 
2007, pp. 76-77; Grenoble, 2004, pp. 153-154). Russian was demoted to a 
language of administration and political contention increased in intensity, 
fanned by economic decline, political stasis and the turbulence that swept 
other parts of the ussr, including the Baltics and the Caucasus.
2 As will be argued below, this was especially true for sections of the Dushanbe secular 
intelligentsia.
3 As will be discussed in greater detail below, one of the chief dissident afgancв was 
Mahmadali Hait, an erstwhile military interpreter with the gru, the Soviet Armed Forces 
intelligence agency, who became a leading member of the Tajik opposition.
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During 1989, some ex-participants of the intervention supported moves 
towards linguistic reform, while others mobilised to defend their reputations 
anН prТvТlОgОs at a tТmО аСОn tСОв аОrО ТncrОasТnglв fallТng out of oficТal 
favour. Developments in 1989, furthermore, set the scene for the distur-
bances that swept the Tajik capital Dushanbe in February 1990, an event 
that dealt a profound shock to the republic’s political establishment. Issues 
of national revival, religion and Soviet identity came to the fore in this crisis 
that caused deep ruptures in Tajik society and began a period of contention 
that paved the way for the outbreak of a civil war in Tajikistan in 1992. 
The ex-participants found themselves on both sides of the barricades during 
the February disturbances, although a large number of former conscripts in 
Dushanbe came out in support of the established political order.4
This paper explores some of the different positions of former partici-
pants of the Afghan War in Tajikistan in the context of the political changes 
that took place in the republic in the late 1980s. It draws on interviews with 
eighty former participants of the Afghan War, both soldiers and civilians, 
as well as extensive documentary research. Collected over the course of 
seven months in Tajikistan in 2013 and 2014, the interviews offer windows 
into the personal histories of the ex-participants, including their involve-
mОnt Тn polТtТcs Тn tСО latО SovТОt pОrТoН. It Тs tСО irst largО-scalО ТnvОstТ-
gatТon Тnto tСО lТvОs of formОr TajТk partТcТpants Тn tСО SovТОt conlТct Тn 
Afghanistan and provides new insights into the role that the war played in 
their political formation.
The interviews were conducted in the cities and towns of Dushanbe, 
Qurghonteppa, Khorugh and Kulob, as well as in small localities in the 
Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region in Eastern Tajikistan. Fifty-two 
of the respondents had served in the Afghan War as conscripts; eighteen 
had been military interpreters, either with the Soviet Army or with Interior 
Ministry (Mvd) forces; seven had worked in Afghanistan in a civilian 
capacТtв, аСТlО, lastlв, tСrОО СaН irst sОrvОН as mТlТtarв ТntОrprОtОrs bОforО 
going back “across the river” to work as civilian advisers or interpreters. 
The respondents were found through contacts, veterans’ organisations and 
4 Both the republican and the central presses reported on the afgancв who mobilised on the 
side of the law-enforcement bodies during the disturbances (Karpov, 1990, p. 2; Sautin, 
1990, p. 6; Ponomarev, 1990, p. 2).
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even unexpectedly on streets, in shops and (in a surprisingly large number 
of cases) behind the steering wheels of taxis.
The interviews threw up a number of methodological issues, centred 
on bТas, sОlОctТvТtв anН laаОН mОmorв. AttОmpt аas maНО to lТmТt tСО 
impact of these issues through the use of a large number of interviews, 
source triangulation, and also a proactive interview style where seemingly 
implausible or overly simplistic claims were interrogated more carefully. 
Many respondents wished to be anonymous while others were happy to 
speak on record. All but one of the interviews were conducted in Russian. 
Most of them were recorded.5 No interpreter was used.
The paper argues that the war had both subversive and conservative 
ТnluОncОs on polТtТcal НТscussТons Тn tСО latО SovТОt pОrТoН. WСТlО sОrvТcО 
anН аork Тn AfgСanТstan ТntroНucОН a sТgnТicant numbОr of TajТk ТntОl-
lОctuals to a PОrsТanatО culturО tСat carrТОН nonО of tСО RussТan ТnluОncОs 
that had reshaped Tajik culture during more than a century of Russian and 
Soviet domination – a fact tСat plaвОН a sТgnТicant rolО Тn tСО movОmОnt 
for language reform – it also entrenched pro-Soviet sentiment among many 
Tajik servicemen who had killed and suffered on behalf of the Soviet Union. 
Other processes of socialisation certainly also played a part – including 
the mass patriotic propaganda that pervaded the lives of Soviet citizens in 
the 1970s and the 1980s and the intellectual sub-debates that primed the 
mТnНs of TajТk scСolars, journalТsts anН cultural igurОs to ТssuОs of natТonal 
identity and cultural revival. Yet, as will be argued below, the Afghan War 
аas a formatТvО ОбpОrТОncО for tСousanНs of solНТОrs, oficОrs anН aНvТsОrs 
who, on the other side of the Amu Darya, encountered a society that was 
both intriguingly similar to, and remarkably different from, their own.
The Impact of the Afghan War
There has been a curious silence in academic research about the impact 
of the Soviet-Afghan War on Central Asia, despite the close cultural and 
geographical links between Afghanistan and the region. Most of those 
texts that do address the topic either tend to focus on issues of religious 
radicalisation (Bennigsen, 1989; Johnson, 2007, pp. 65, 112; Hiro, 2009, 
5 One interview was conducted in English. Notes were taken when interviews could not be 
recorded.
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pp. 315-318), a matter whose importance has been overblown,6 or else 
give only scant references to the political changes that occurred in the 
war’s wake. Few publications tackle the topic more comprehensively, one 
notable exception being Artemy Kalinovsky’s discussion about the regio-
nal effects of the war (Kalinovsky, 2013b).7
It is only through the work of a handful of researchers that we have 
begun to explore the war’s impact in broader terms (Roy, 1997; Tasar, 2011; 
Kalinovsky, 2013b). One oft-forgotten fact is that the Soviet intervention, 
in many ways, represented a boon for the governments of the Central Asian 
republics, particularly Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, whose territories were 
converted into important bases for the occupation.8 The two Southern repu-
blТcs bОcamО aаasС аТtС mТlТtarв aТН anН inancТng anН rОcОТvОН ТncrОasОН 
political attention from Moscow. Termez, an Uzbek town that had had only 
modest importance prior to the 1979 invasion, for example, was made a 
key organising hub of the military campaign.9 Meanwhile, bridges were 
built across the Amu Darya, connecting Central Asia with Afghanistan and 
permitting the transport of troops and supplies to the war zone, thereby tur-
ning the once peripheral Muslim republics from backwaters into launching 
pads for the Soviet occupation.
Similarly, scant attention has been paid to the roles that Uzbekistan 
and Tajikistan played as showcases of Soviet achievement.10 Delegations 
6 TСО аar НoОs sООm to СavО ТnluОncОН rОlТgТous НТscussТons Тn unНОrgrounН IslamТc 
groups (Khalid, 2007, pp. 145-147; Nourzhanov & Bleuer, 2013, pp. 244-51). Yet, those 
discussions, it seems, did not spread beyond that narrow and secretive space. As Kirill 
NourгСanov anН CСrТstТan BlОuОr poТnt out, tСО oficТal IslamТc clОrgв Тn TajТkТstan 
remained vocal in its support of the Soviet intervention (ibid., p. 249).
7 Olivier Roy offers an insightful (if also rather sweeping) discussion of Central Asia in the 
context of the Afghan War (Roy, 1997, pp. 170, 180, 191, 192, 197, 233, 234), touching 
on tСО stratОgТc ТmportancО of CОntral AsТa НurТng tСО conlТct, tСО rolО of CОntral AsТan 
soldiers in the occupation, the importance of academic exchange between Central Asia 
and Afghanistan and the alleged impact that the war had on the restructuring of the Tajik 
security apparatus in the 1980s. Other sources that address the topic are Dudoignon, 1998; 
and Spolnikov, 2004.
8 Olivier Roy makes this observation (Roy, 1997, p. 197).
9 Ashkhabad was another important centre. Both Ashkhabad and Termez were part of 
the Turkestan Military District, which as Mark Urban has noted increased in strategic 
ТmportancО aftОr 1982, аСОn traТnТng facТlТtТОs tСОrО аОrО ОбpanНОН for tСО bОnОit of troops 
destined for the Afghan campaign (Urban, 1988, p. 130).
10 One who does dwell on the importance of Central Asia for PR purposes is Eren Tasar in 
his exploration of the Central Asian Islamic clerical establishment and its role in promoting 
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of AfgСan oficТals, profОssТonals anН stuНОnts crossОН tСО Amu Darвa 
during the war to study the economic, social and political advances that 
tСО CОntral AsТan MuslТms СaН maНО unНОr tСО SovТОt lag.11 Mindful of 
the close ties between Central Asia and Afghanistan, Soviet leaders hoped, 
it seems, that the visits would offer opportunities for the Afghans to draw 
inspiration from the successes of their Sovietised religious and ethnic kin.12 
DurТng tСО vТsТts, SovТОt oficТals routТnОlв poТntОН out tСat CОntral AsТa, 
too, had suffered from wretched poverty before the advent of Communist 
power and that it was thanks to Soviet government that the region had got 
up on Тts fООt. TСТs kТnН of rСОtorТc Тs ОбОmplТiОН bв tСО folloаТng statО-
ment by Tajik First Party Secretary R.N. Nabiev, delivered at a meeting 
аТtС AfgСan oficТals Тn 1983:
The successes that we have attained […] are the result of the wise Leninist 
national policies of the cpsu, the friendship of all the nationalities and 
peoples of the great Country of the Soviets and the advantages of the Soviet 
social structure (Anonymous, 1983).
There is a thinly veiled subtext in Nabiev’s words that the Afghans 
could reproduce those same successes if they proceeded down the same 
Leninist path as Tajikistan.
A topic that has received more attention is the Central Asians who 
took part in the Soviet intervention. These young men (the vast majority 
were men) were well-represented in the Soviet force, particularly in the 
early years when they seem to have made up a large part of the milita-
ry contingent (Zhou, 2012, p. 323). For this reason, they have attracted 
sТgnТicant ТntОrОst from WОstОrn obsОrvОrs. ВОt, as аО sСall sОО, also СОrО 
numerous questions have been left unanswered.
a state-led religious structure in Afghanistan (Tasar, 2011).
11 A steady stream of Afghan delegations visited Tajikistan and other Central Asian 
republics on diplomatic and study visits. The Tajik press reported effusively on these events 
(Anonymous, 1980a, 1980b, 1980c, 1983, 1985).
12 Central Asia had long played the part of Soviet showpiece. As Artemy Kalinovsky 
(2013a) has pointed out, the Muslim republics had helped to showcase Soviet advances in 
the Third World since the Khrushchev era, when Moscow stepped up efforts to woo over 
newly decolonised countries to its model of development.
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The Central Asian Participants
Western observers began to take an interest in the Soviet Muslim sol-
diers already at the start of the Afghan campaign. A series of articles publi-
shed by the rand Corporation13 Тn tСО 1980s аОrО ОspОcТallв ТnluОntТal 
in setting the terms of the discussion. These articles, which drew on com-
monplace assumptions about the Central Asians as less fully Sovietised 
than Slavs, painted the Central Asians as the weak link in the intervention 
force and made claims such as:
It is clear from eyewitness reports […] [that] the Soviet Central Asian sol-
diers fraternized with the Afghan population, and that this fraternization was 
wide-ranging enough to make Soviet authorities uncomfortable lest Soviet 
Central Asians become infected with pro-Afghan, Islamic, nationalist or 
anti-Russian sympathies (Wimbush & Alexiev, 1981, p. 16).
Other observers followed suit. Edward Girardet, a Swiss-American 
journalist who began reporting on Afghanistan even before the invasion, 
rОlaвОН rОports tСat “An unconirmОН numbОr […] of SovТОt MuslТm 
troops from the Central Asian Republic” changed sides during a Soviet 
offensive against the rebel commander Ahmad Shah Massoud (Girardet, 
1985, p. 84).14 The military historian Leo J. Daugherty iii, too, spoke of 
Central Asian disloyalty and disaffection, although he did so using more 
bombastic language:
Soviet Muslims, forced to serve in a Russian-dominated military, alienated, 
often the subject of racism, chauvinism, and interethnic violence, rediscovered 
once again in Afghanistan the sense of nationalism that had been ‘snuffed out’ 
by the Soviet authorities in the 1920s and 1930s (Daugherty iii, 1995, p. 90).15
OtСОr rОsОarcСОrs СavО contОstОН tСОsО claТms, ТnsТstТng tСat tСОв inН 
little basis in the evidence. Christian Bleuer, in his study of Muslim soldiers 
13 The rand Corporation is a U.S. think tank with close ties to the U.S. defence sector. It 
is based in Santa Monica, California, and provides research and analysis to the U.S. armed 
forces and other public and private organisations.
14 See also p. 230, where Girardet states that “According to various estimates, as many as 
300 Soviet poWs were being held alive by different guerrilla organisations in 1984. This did 
not include a small, but undetermined, number of Soviet deserters, many of Central Asian 
origin, known to be actively operating with the resistance or living in relative freedom 
among the Afghans.”
15 Other sources expressing scepticism about the loyalty and competence of the Central 
Asian soldiers include Broxup, 1983; Broxup, 1983b; Bennigsen, 1984; Alexiev, 1988; 
Szayna, 1991; Daugherty iii, 1994; Daugherty iii, 1995; Clayton, 1999; Mathers, 2003.
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in a number of non-Muslim majority armies, cites a document published 
by the Russian Union of Afghanistan Veterans that lists only seventeen or 
eighteen Soviet Muslims as having defected to the Mujahaddin (Bleuer, 
2012, p. 5). Rodric Braithwaite, in turn, notes that out of the 333 Soviet 
servicemen who were unaccounted for at the end of the war, only 44, 
including both Slavs and non-Slavs, were known to have joined the rebels 
(Braithwaite, 2011, p. 257). Another striking fact is that Central Asian soldiers 
died in similar numbers as other Soviet nationalities in Afghanistan, which, 
as Mark Galeotti has observed, is hardly evidence of a general Central 
Asian disengagement from the war (Galeotti, 1995, p. 28). Today, Tajik 
Afghan War veterans are adamant that they performed their service 
stОaНfastlв. As Sattor DžalТlov, cСaТrman of tСО DusСanbО sОctТon of tСО 
Committee on Soldier-Internationalist Affairs, commented in an interview 
with the author in 2013:
[The Tajik soldiers] served proudly with their heads raised […]. Among the 
Tajiks from Tajikistan, who served in Afghanistan, there were no deserters 
or traitors who went over to the Mujahaddin […]. On the contrary, they all 
fulillОН tСОТr Нutв СОroТcallв (DžalТlov, 2013, ТntОrvТОа).
But even though recent research has rebuffed the claims of the rand 
Corporation, Daugherty iii and others, it has left two important points 
unaddressed. Firstly, it has said little about the lives of the Central Asians 
aftОr tСОТr НОmobТlТsatТon. TСТs Тs a sТgnТicant lacuna, for Тf аО arО ТntО-
rested in the political and cultural impact of the war, we must surely also 
consider the experiences of the Tajik soldiers after their return from the war.
Secondly, little interest has been forthcoming, even in the halls of the 
rand Corporation, for the non-military participants in the war, that is 
the civilian advisers, interpreters and technical specialists who took part 
Тn tСО conlТct at somО НТstancО from tСО irТng lТnОs. TСОsО ТnНТvТНuals 
were spared the rigid discipline and authoritarianism of the 40th Army and 
enjoyed for the most part well-remunerated positions with little exposure 
to vТolОncО. As sucС tСОв ОбpОrТОncОН tСО conlТct Тn a markОНlв НТffОrОnt 
аaв from tСО solНТОrs anН oficОrs. A numbОr of tСО ТntОrprОtОrs anН aНvТ-
sers (although by no means all) returned from the war with new perspec-
tives on their national identity and the political imperatives that lay before 
their republic.
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The following sections discuss the political involvement of both mili-
tary and civilian ex-participants in Tajikistan in the late 1980s. Focusing 
on the year 1989, it shows that the trajectories of these two groups diver-
ged in important ways not only during the war but also after their return 
to TajТkТstan. WСТlО manв formОr conscrТpts anН oficОrs bОcamО closОlв 
wedded to the structures of political authority, others joined the movement 
for cultural and linguistic revival of the republic, a number of them as 
members of opposition organisations such as “Rastokhez.”
Conscripts and Oficers
Separation
StuНОnts of latО SovТОt polТtТcs maв inН surprТsТng tСО claТm tСat 
Afghan War veterans in Tajikistan became closely linked to structures of 
political authority. In other places, former ‘soldier-internationalists’ were 
vociferous in their criticism of the powers-that-be, driven by a sense that 
they had been cheated of the rewards which they had been promised on 
their deployment to Afghanistan. As Rafael Reuveny and Aseem Prakash 
have argued (1999, p. 703): “The Afgantsв felt betrayed. Many of them 
organТгОН Тnto vТgТlantО groups НОtОrmТnОН to igСt tСО monОв grubbОrs 
and ‘scroungers’ who had sent them to war and were ignoring their exis-
tence. By the late 1980s, some Afgantsв had begun organising themselves 
politically.”16
In Tajikistan, too, Afghan War veterans were not shy to criticise 
tСО autСorТtТОs, partТcularlв aftОr tСО pОrОstroТka rОforms rОlaбОН ofi-
cial controls on public discussions in the second half of the 1980s. An 
important platform for disgruntled afgancв was Paëmi Dušanbe [Voice 
of Dushanbe], a liberal-minded newspaper founded in January 1990 that 
became a channel of unorthodox views in late-Soviet Tajikistan. In the 
Оarlв 1990s, Тt ran numОrous artТclОs bв formОr igСtОrs, аСo spokО out 
on a varТОtв of ТssuОs ТncluНТng tСО poor provТsТon of vОtОran bОnОits anН 
the stepmotherly treatment of veterans by lackadaisical bureaucrats. Two 
of tСО most prolТic scrТbОs НurТng tСТs tТmО аОrО Šavkat Mirzoev and 
Valī Sajërabek (he later changed his name to Sajërabekov), both former 
16 Afgancв is a common Soviet shorthand for veterans of the Soviet-Afghan War. It is still 
widely used today, including in Tajikistan, and will be employed in this article, too.
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oficОr-ТntОrprОtОrs аСo acСТОvОН promТnОncО Тn tСО vОtОrans movОmОnt 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. One of their articles, “We do not hold 
anything from you,” (1990, p. 1) described the dire conditions in which 
many afgancв lived and accused the authorities of neglecting the fate of the 
individuals whom they had promised to help: “Senior-ranked individuals 
make promises but do nothing.”17 Another article addressed the housing 
shortage in Dushanbe, which was perhaps the most vexing issue for the 
Об-igСtОrs, аСo СaН bООn promТsОН prТorТtв СousТng as part of tСО packagО 
of bОnОits to аСТcС tСОв аОrО ОntТtlОН, but СaН rОcОТvОН vОrв lТttlО of tСТs 
kind (Sajërabek, 1990, p. 2).
Mirroring similar trends elsewhere in the ussr, the Tajik afgancв 
bОgan at tСТs tТmО to organТsО tСОmsОlvОs outsТНО of tСО coninОs of ofi-
cial bodies. Ibragim Yatimov, one veteran activist in Dushanbe, reported 
that district-level veterans councils appeared across Tajikistan in the years 
1985-1987 (ВatТmov, 2014, ТntОrvТОа). If tСТs Тs corrОct, tСОв аОrО tСО irst 
instances of the autonomous veterans movement. They eventually coales-
ced into larger units, such as the city-wide organisation of Afghan War 
veterans in Dushanbe, established in 1989, and the Union of Veterans of 
the Afghan War (svav under the Russian acronym), set up in 1992 with 
tСО aspТratТon to rОprОsОnt all vОtОrans Тn TajТkТstan (MОžНunaroНnвj soûг 
“BoОvoО bratstvo,” n.Н.). Valī Sajërabekov, who was one of the founding 
members of the Dushanbe city organisation in 1989, explained to the 
author that he and other Dushanbe-based veteran activists had decided to 
establish the organisation after realising that the law regulating the affairs 
of the veterans was not being enforced by the authorities (Sajërabekov, 
2014, interview).
Thus, there was a growing separation between the veterans and the 
authorities in Tajikistan in the late 1980s, a trend that mimicked develop-
ments elsewhere in the Soviet Union. This accelerated after Soviet forces 
were withdrawn from Afghanistan between May 1988 and February 1989. 
Having been celebrated as heroes in some quarters in the mid-1980s, the 
veterans now saw public concern for them fade as Soviet society moved 
to forget the war and to confront other, more pressing challenges. The 
17 The newspaper also ran columns where veterans reminisced about their service, giving 
both highly critical and more positive appraisals of their service (Hait, Šodiev & Sajërabek, 
1990, p. 2).
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situation was compounded by a growing economic crisis and declining 
state authority. Afghan War veterans who had long been frustrated with 
tСО poor provТsТon of bОnОits bОcamО ОvОr morО outspokОn Тn tСО lОan anН 
cСaotТc inal вОars of tСО SovТОt UnТon, takТng aНvantagО of tСО nОа frОО-
Нoms provТНОН bв pОrОstroТka. It аas no coТncТНОncО tСat tСО irst cТtв-аТНО 
organisation of afgancв in Dushanbe was created in 1989 and that it appa-
rently had as one of its main tasks to lobby the city authorities on behalf 
of the veterans (Yatimov, 2014, interview; Sajërabekov, 2014, interview).
TСО НТmТnТsСТng publТc ТntОrОst Тn tСО vОtОrans аas rОlОctОН Тn tСО 
declining press coverage afforded to them in the republic. Having once 
been lauded as model Soviet citizens, the veterans quickly disappeared 
from public view after the Soviet presence in Afghanistan was brought 
to a close. If the youth-oriented newspaper Komsomolec Tadžikistana had 
given extensive attention to the soldier-internationalists in earlier years, 
it now slowed its reporting on them to a trickle. In the ten months that 
followed the withdrawal, only a handful of pieces about the veterans were 
printed in this publication that just a few years earlier had peppered its pages 
with portraits of the ‘patriotic’ and ‘steadfast’ soldier-internationalists, 
role models for the Tajik youth.18 The usefulness of the veterans seemed 
indeed to have run its course.
Outspoken Partners
Yet, despite the many bones of contention between the veterans and the 
statО autСorТtТОs, onО sСoulН not ОбaggОratО tСО conlТct bОtаООn tСОm. Most 
of all, the afgancв played the part of an aggravated interest group that was 
determined to hold the authorities to account for their failures to uphold the 
rights of the veterans. They made few moves that might have challenged the 
authority and legitimacy of the governing bodies in the republic.
Indeed, for all their disenchantment with the state bureaucracy, the sol-
dier-internationalists continued to work closely with the authorities. They 
attОnНОН govОrnmОnt mООtТngs, marcСОН Тn oficТal paraНОs anН СОlpОН to 
conduct so-called ‘military and patriotic education’ among the republican 
18 These portraits were fairly regular features in the Komsomol broadsheet in 1986 and 
1987. Describing the young soldiers’ lives, they turned on themes of tragedy and honour, 
discussing instances of both lamentable death and heroic action (Romanok, 1986, p. 3; 
Salimina, 1986, p. 3; Casûk, 1985, p. 3).
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youth.19 Conversely, the authorities were present at many of the meetings 
of the veterans. At a conference of soldier-internationalists in Lenin district 
in February 1989, for example, the delegates included representatives of 
the district voenkomaty (military commissariats), the district Komsomol 
(Communist Youth League) and the Interior Ministry (Tret’âkova, 1989, 
p. 1). Ibragim Yatimov reported that the Komsomol even assisted in 
the creation of the Dushanbe city-organisation in 1989 (Yatimov, 2014, 
interview).
The veterans knew fully well that they remained dependent on the 
authorities in numerous ways. Not only did the government adminis-
tОr tСО provТsТon of vОtОran bОnОits but Тt аas also tСО maТn sourcО of 
lОgal, polТtТcal anН moral rОcognТtТon for tСО formОr igСtОrs. It аas аТtС 
Komsomol assistance, for instance, that a monument to fallen soldier-in-
ternationalists was built in Dushanbe’s Mironenko Park (Anonymous, 
1990, p. 4). It was, similarly, by decree from the local executive com-
mittee of Ordžonikidzeabad that one of the streets in the town was renamed 
after Rustam Sangov, a private who had been killed in Afghanistan and 
postСumouslв aаarНОН tСО RОН Star (Anonвmous, 1989, p. 1). OficТal 
approval was naturally required also for the interment of fallen soldier-in-
ternationalists in “The Avenue of Glory” (Alleâ slavy), a section of one 
of the Dushanbe cemeteries where soldiers of the Second World War also 
lay buried. Although the veterans developed some independent sources of 
inancТng ovОr tТmО, ОspОcТallв tСrougС tСО ОstablТsСmОnt of autonomous 
co-operatives in the late 1980s,20 they remained very much dependent on 
the authorities for the public celebration of their memory.
Compounding these close links were personal ties between Afghan War 
vОtОrans anН oficТal boНТОs. Šavkat Mirzoev was not only a deputy leader of 
the Dushanbe city organisation but also a member of the Communist Party, 
having petitioned to join it during his service in Afghanistan (Podivilova, 
1987, p. 1). He was also employed in the Dushanbe city bureaucracy, where 
he was charged with monitoring local prices (Mirzoev, 2013, interview). 
19 There is an abundance of press reports on afgancв participating in events of this kind. A 
few examples are: Asimov, 1986, p. 2; SaТНov, 1986, p. 4; SvТНčОnko, 1987, p. 4.
20 In correspondence with the author, Ibragim Yatimov reported that a number of afgancв 
аСo oаnОН coopОratТvОs provТНОН inancТal aТН to tСО DusСanbО cТtв organТsatТon. 
Meanwhile, Mark Galeotti in his 1992 PhD dissertation mentions a haberdashery in 
Dushanbe apparently run by Afghan War veterans (Galeotti, 1992, p. 138).
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This was in the early 1990s, in other words, around the very time when he 
was penning critical articles about bureaucrats in Paëmi Dušanbe. Another 
prominent afgancв leader was Surobšo Alimov, the founding chairman of 
the svav. Before his election as chairman, he made his name as an activist 
in the Komsomol, in whose Dushanbe branch he had risen to the posi-
tТon of irst sОcrОtarв bв tСО Оarlв 1990s (MОžНunaroНnТj soûz “Boevoe 
bratstvo,” n.d.). Other veterans interviewed for this research also reported 
having found work in security bodies after their service, including the 
police, the military and the kgb.21 All of this paints a picture of a veterans 
movement invested in state structures not only through organisational and 
personal ties but also through a desire for state support and recognition. 
NОvОrtСОlОss, tСОsО аОrО not tСО onlв rОasons for tСО closО afinТtв bОtаООn 
the state and the veterans. As we will see, there were also deeper causes.
State and Soldier
The vast majority of the future soldiers of the Afghan War were born in 
the 1960s, which meant that they came of age in the Brezhnev period, a time 
when the Soviet state stepped up its campaign of military and patriotic rhe-
toric. This was especially noticeable in the late 1960s, when militarist and 
patriotic propaganda began to sweep over the ussr. ArtТclОs, ilms, books 
and public events pushing patriotic themes began to occupy a larger part 
of the public discourse.22 A string of outsize memorial complexes honou-
ring the victory in the Second World War (baptised the Great Patriotic War 
in the Soviet lexicon) were erected in cities and towns across the Soviet 
Union, and Victory Day (9 May) was in 1965 made a public holiday for 
tСО irst tТmО agaТn sТncО 1947 (TumarkТn, 2003, p. 597). TСО cОlОbratТons 
were based on earlier forms of commemoration but their large scale and 
high-pitched rhetoric marked a break with the past. Increasingly, militarist 
tropes and imagery were being used to socialise the Soviet population.
21 This appears to have been a common career path for many afgancв, particularly for 
those who had had little or no higher education prior to their service in Afghanistan. Two 
of tСО currОnt top tСrОО oficТals of tСО QurgСontОppa UnТon of SolНТОr-IntОrnatТonalТsts, 
for example, are retired policemen, as is the head of the Kulob organisation of Afghan War 
vОtОrans. SОvОral top rankТng oficТals of tСО НТstrТct organТsatТons of tСО CommТttОО on 
Soldier-Internationalist Affairs in Dushanbe also have a history of security work, as do a 
largО numbОr of rank-anН-ilО mОmbОrs аТtС аСom tСО autСor spokО.
22 For a discussion of military-patriotic rhetoric in the Brezhnev period see: Holloway, 
1980; Simes, 1981-1982; Jones & Grupp, 1982; Cooper, 1989; Weiner, 1996.
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The main targets of the new drive were male adolescents and post- 
adolescents, especially those of pre-draft age soon to pass through the 
tortuous halls of Soviet military service. Young Soviets were increasingly 
exposed to what was shorthanded as “military-patriotic education”. This 
was an organised campaign to promote state-approved values of discipline, 
patrТotТsm anН sОlf-sacrТicО. StatО ТnstТtutТons tСat СaН traНТtТonallв bООn 
tasked with ideological and mobilising functions were enlisted in the cam-
paign. One of these, the Volunteer Society for Cooperation with the Army, 
Aviation, and Fleet (abbreviated as dosaaF in Russian), had a long history 
of preparing future conscripts. Now it came to play a key role in milita-
ry-patriotic education, boasting a membership of approximately 65 million 
in 1978 (Simes, 1981-1982, p. 140). The Komsomol, too, saw a dramatic 
expansion of its membership: from 23 million in 1966 to 34 million in 
1975 – a 48% increase (Hahn, 1969, p. 220; Brezhnev, 1975), which can be 
compared to a 26% increase in the Soviet population between the 1959 and 
1979 censuses (Eason, 1959, p. 598; Blum and Chesnais, 1986, p. 1044).
Given its amplitude, the military-patriotic discourse was an unavoi-
dable touchstone in the lives of the young Tajiks. Through newspapers, 
books, monuments, public events, meetings with WWii veterans, instruc-
tion at school, speeches at Komsomol gatherings, training sessions with 
the dosaaF and many other channels, the young Tajiks were exposed to 
a mОssagО tСat glorТiОН patrТotТsm anН mТlТtarТsm anН strОssОН tСО nООН 
for Soviet males always to be ready to defend their country. Even though 
the propaganda was often crude, and may well have elicited cynicism and 
indifference as well as earnest belief, it was an overpowering message. 
Intense and salient in the Brezhnev years, it was a key reference point for 
the new generation of Tajiks.
Importantly, the rhetoric seems to have helped to frame the experiences 
of many Tajik soldiers in Afghanistan. For reasons that have been explored 
in more detail elsewhere, the war did not, by and large, challenge the 
basic assumptions of the ideology that had been absorbed by the soldiers 
in their adolescent years (Göransson, 2017). On the contrary, service in 
Afghanistan provided them with an opportunity to satisfy some of the 
exhortations implicit in that discourse. After all, through their actions, the 
soldier-internationalists were able to prove that they were ready to go to 
war on behalf of the Motherland, thereby meeting that injunction that had 
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been a staple of the military-patriotic education since their childhoods. 
Although the Tajiks were not immune to doubts and a sense of ruefulness 
about their part in the war,23 these doubts did not, in all but a few cases, 
translate into a wholesale rejection of the Soviet war effort.24
Any lingering regret was also quickly muted when the veterans returned 
СomО, irst bв an almost complОtО mОНТa sТlОncО on tСО topТc of tСО аar,25 
then, beginning in the mid-1980s, by an onslaught of celebratory propa-
ganНa tСat praТsОН tСО solНТОrs аСo СaН takОn part Тn tСО conlТct.26 This 
situation left little room for veterans to articulate any abiding misgivings 
about tСО nТnО-вОar conlТct. Nor аas tСОrО mucС ТncОntТvО to Нo so. TСО 
oficТal vОnОratТon of tСО solНТОr-ТntОrnatТonalТsts anН tСО bОnОits аСТcС 
tСОв rОcОТvОН аОrО justТiОН on tСО basТs of tСО sОrvТcО tСОв СaН pОrformОН 
for their country. Playing along with the rhetoric made it easier for them 
to make a claim for more favourable treatment. Indeed, more than one 
veteran found it expedient to turn the rhetoric around and use it to criti-
23 While most respondents denied having felt remorse about participating in the war, some 
did admit that doubts had entered their minds. In all these cases, they were adamant that 
sucС tСougСts СaН not prОvОntОН tСОm from fulillТng tСОТr Нutв. As onО formОr rТlОman 
said, doubts “did arise. They did arise. We didn’t choose to go [to Afghanistan] ourselves. 
TСОв tolН us to comО anН sОrvО, anН аО аОrО brougСt tСОrО […]. It аas НТficult. SomОtТmОs 
Тt аas НТficult. TСОrО Тs no аar tСat НoОs not affОct [orНТnarв pОoplО]” (Anonвmous
3
, 
2013, interview). Similarly, another veteran, who was attending the celebration of the 
25th anniversary of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan together with some friends in 
Dushanbe, said that none of them were wearing their medals because it was embarrassing: 
“They’re our compatriots (zemlâki), tСОв arО also MuslТms. WСo аОrО аО igСtТng? It’s 
embarrassing for us to wear our medals” (Anonymous
6
, 2014, interview).
24 OnО ОбcОptТon аas MaСmaНalī HaТt, a formОr gru intelligence operative who took part in 
secret negotiations with Ahmad Shah Massoud. More will be said about him below.
25 The Tajik press reported very little on the war in its early years and was particularly frugal 
аТtС rОports on tСО partТcТpatТon of SovТОt solНТОrs Тn tСО conlТct. TСО irst artТclО about 
an Afghan War veteran in the Dushanbe newspaper Večernij Dušanbe was published on 
3 April 1987, that is more than six years into the war. It was about Šavkat Mirzoev, a model 
soldier, who not only had received multiple prestigious decorations (including two Orders 
of the Red Star) but was also a candidate member of the Communist Party about to attain 
full membership (Podivilova, 1987, p. 1).
26 This shift was particularly noticeable in Komsomolec Tadžikistana, which in the early 
1980s devoted little attention to the Afghan War and its Soviet soldiers but in the second half 
of the decade began to run a well-orchestrated campaign lauding the soldier-internationalists. 
During this later period, it regularly published short biographies of selected soldiers, 
complete with photographs and requisite praise of their patriotism and military ardour. See 
for example E. Dudukina, 1987, p. 2; I. Dudukina, 1987, p. 1; Kholmova, 1987, p. 1.
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cise authorities who failed to provide support to the people who had made 
sacrТicОs for tСОТr MotСОrlanН.27
Many seem to have embraced elements of the discourse in earnest. 
One was Murodšo Navruzšoev, a former scout from Khorugh, who pur-
sued a military career in the army after his demobilisation from the war in 
AfgСanТstan. HТs fatСОr, СТmsОlf a rОtТrОН mТlТtarв oficОr аТtС ОбpОrТОncО 
in Afghanistan, explained to the author that his son, who sadly passed away 
in 2008, had wanted to follow in his father’s footsteps and had voluntee-
red to serve in Afghanistan. Indeed, after being wounded in the war, 
Murodšo turned down an offer to be reposted to the Soviet Union. Instead, 
he returned to his unit near Mazar-i-Sharif and completed his service in 
Afghanistan (Navruzšoev, 2013, interview). A photo album that Murodšo 
put together after his demobilisation speaks of the tragedy of the war but 
also of his own sense of pride in being a Soviet soldier: black-and-white 
hand sketches of scenes from the war mingle with photographs of himself 
in uniform, decorations covering his chest.
Many veterans also remained in a close relationship with state structures 
through their links to an array of bodies responsible for managing veterans 
affairs. Before the Afghan War, an institutional framework had grown up 
to cater for the veterans of the Great Patriotic War, who were celebrated as 
paragons of honour and patriotism. That same framework was now used to 
engage with the Afghan War veterans, who, like their WWii predecessors, 
were held up as role models for young citizens. The military conscription 
oficОs anН tСО local ОбОcutТvО commТttООs maТntaТnОН rОgТstrТОs, organТsОН 
ОvОnts, ТssuОН cОrtТicatОs, aНmТnТstОrОН bОnОits, Оtc. TСО Komsomol, too, 
became closely involved with the afgancв, particularly after the cpsu and 
tСО CouncТl of MТnТstОrs grantОН tСО formОr igСtОrs lОgal status as partТ-
cipants of military action in 1983. Through meetings and publications in 
its mouthpiece, Komsomolec Tadžikistana, the youth organisation depicted 
tСО AfgСan War vОtОrans as ОбОmplars of patrТotТsm anН sОllОssnОss. TСТs 
bore important parallels with the way in which WWii veterans had pre-
viously been paraded to the Soviet public. Indeed, the afgancв were often 
invited to participate in events that were strikingly similar to the public 
displays in which the veterans of the Great Patriotic War had once taken 
27 Šavkat MТrгoОv’s anН Valī SajщrabОk’s artТclОs Тn Paëmi Dušanbe (Mirzoev & Sajërabek, 
1990, p. 1; Sajërabek, 1990, p. 2) are good examples of this.
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part, including meetings with school pupils and participation in milita-
ry-patriotic education and public parades.
Hence, there were a multitude of forces that conspired to maintain 
the discourse of patriotism into which the afgancв had been socialised as 
children and adolescents. A public campaign got underway in the republi-
can press in the mid-1980s extolling the patriotic virtues of the young men 
who had taken part in the war across the river. On their return, the veterans, 
moreover, entered into a close relationship with a number of institutions 
that were tasked with managing veterans affairs. These institutions had 
both pastoral and ideological objectives, charged both with addressing the 
economic, social and housing needs of the veterans and with efforts to draw 
tСО formОr igСtОrs Тnto a campaТgn of mТlТtarв anН patrТotТc propaganНa. 
Many Afghan War veterans appear to have readily embraced this discourse 
of patriotism and honour. Not only was it key to the public recognition to 
which they aspired but it was also a central component of their relationship 
аТtС tСО publТc ТnstТtutТons on аСТcС tСОТr bОnОits НОpОnНОН. In orНОr to 
understand the enduring ties between the veterans and the state in the late 
1980s – which was a time of growing political contention – it is necessary 
to appreciate the strength of this discourse that placed patriotism at the 
very heart of what it meant to be a veteran of war in the Soviet Union.
Advisers and Interpreters
The Other War
WСТlО WОstОrn lТtОraturО Сas gТvОn sТgnТicant attОntТon to tСО mТlТtarв 
НТmОnsТon of tСО SovТОt conlТct Тn AfgСanТstan, tСО аar СaН otСОr facОs, 
too. Accompanying the roughly 100,000-120,000 troops in Afghanistan28 
was a formidable state-building machinery, set in place to further the poli-
tical, economic and social transformation of the war-torn country while 
ensuring widened Soviet control. Artemy Kalinovsky has written about 
the “thousands of technical specialists and political advisers” who were 
dispatched to “help stabilize the government and broaden its base of sup-
port” (Kalinovsky, 2011, p. 32). He has also noted that a prominent role 
28 Estimates vary (Galeotti, 1992, p. 36; Rubin, 2002, p. 125). Rubin notes that in addition 
to the troops stationed in Afghanistan, an estimated 20,000 soldiers conducted sporadic 
operations across the border from bases within the ussr.
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in this effort was played by Central Asians (ibid., p. 33). Commanding 
languages almost identical to tongues spoken in Afghanistan and arguably 
possessing a greater understanding of Afghan society and culture, Central 
Asians were sent in large numbers to help shore up the Kabul regime. Their 
tasks rangОН from aНvТsТng AfgСan oficТals anН translatТng Тn statО anН 
otСОr oficТal ТnstТtutТons to provТНТng tОcСnТcal aНvТcО on agrТcultural anН 
industrial development projects.
Occasionally, the advisers changed their hats, transitioning from a military 
rolО Тnto a cТvТlТan onО. NaНžmТННТn Šoinbodov, who today is a journalist 
Тn DusСanbО, irst sОrvОН multТplО tours as a mТlТtarв oficОr Тn AfgСanТstan 
before returning there on a civilian contract, this time to work as an adviser 
and interpreter with the Komsomol (Šoinbodov, 2013, interview). Another 
former participant, who today works as a Persian scholar in the Tajik capital, 
аas Тn AfgСanТstan for tСО irst tТmО bОtаООn 1975 anН 1979, fulillТng аСat 
he termed a “semi-civilian and semi-military role” at the Ministry of Social 
Work in Mazar-i-Sharif. He came back to Afghanistan again in 1981 to work 
as a civilian translator with the Ministry of Justice in Kabul, a position he 
held until 1985 (Anonymous
1
, 2013, interview).
Sometimes military and civilian roles overlapped. Sardor Rahdor, a 
celebrated poet from Rušan in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast, 
recalled in an interview in March 2014 working as an interpreter for the 
Komsomol in the province of Samangan when he was approached by a 
local Mujahaddin commander. The Mujahad, believing that his wife was 
not able to have children, asked the Soviets to give her medical treatment. 
In rОturn, СО promТsОН to arrangО a tСrОО-montС unТlatОral cОasОirО arounН 
the city of Samangan. A Soviet colonel gave the go-ahead and Mr Rahdor 
was sent together with an Uzbek doctor from Tashkent to pick up the com-
mander’s wife, driving her to Mazar-i-Sharif where she underwent surgery 
at the hands of a Soviet surgical team.
Most of the time, however, the advisers and translators found themselves 
at some distance from the battle lines. Communist power in Afghanistan 
was concentrated in the urban areas, which is where most of the Soviet sup-
port personnel worked. Posted in ministries, educational establishments, 
partв oficОs, СospТtals anН otСОr statО НomaТns, tСОв аОrО sparОН most 
of the violence that was a fact of life in many rural parts of Afghanistan 
as well as the rigid discipline and regimentation that bounded the lives of 
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the Soviet conscripts in the 40th Army. Of course, the advisers, too, were 
beholden to rules that limited their freedom of movement and interaction 
with Afghans,29 but they nevertheless enjoyed a relative freedom. Several 
respondents spoke of the opportunities that had existed for socialising with 
AfgСans, ОvОn аСОrО oficТal SovТОt polТcв proСТbТtОН sucС ТntОractТon. 
SТgnТicantlв, tСО pСвsТcal appОarancО anН languagО proicТОncв of TajТks 
sometimes made it possible for them to blend with Afghans and thereby 
escape the surveillance of the Soviet authorities. The Persian scholar who 
worked as a translator at the Afghan Ministry of Justice, for example, used 
his time in Kabul to research classical Persian texts available in various 
holdings in the capital. In fact, so successful was he in blending with the 
local population that he was once apprehended by Afghan military authori-




Of course, one should not exaggerate the role that former advisers and 
interpreters played in the political life of Tajikistan in the 1980s and early 
1990s. AltСougС no irm numbОrs СavО bООn founН, Тt Тs clОar tСat TajТks 
were well-represented among Soviet non-military personnel. Yet, only a 
small number of them became involved in organised politics on their return 
to tСОТr СomО rОpublТc. InНТvТНuals lТkО ToСrТr AbНuНžabbor, AСmaНšo 
Komilov and Mirbobo Mirrahim, who took up leading roles in the growing 
opposition movement in the late 1980s, were part of a minority of former 
participants of the Afghan intervention who became active in opposition 
politics. Many others took a more muted position in public life.
However, even the less vocal individuals seem to have had an impact 
on discussions that were gathering force in the 1980s. One oft-made point 
in the interviews concerned the high regard that many former advisers 
and translators had for the quality of the Persian spoken and written in 
Afghanistan. As will be discussed further below, several respondents 
reported that their time in Afghanistan had made them more conscious of 
the impoverishment of their own tongue. A number said they discovered in 
Afghanistan a more vigorous and developed Persian culture, unblemished 
29 One former translator said in an interview that he had once entertained a group of Afghan 
friends at his home in Kabul. The very next morning he received a phone call from the kgb, 





by the legacy of Russian and Soviet rule. Their time in Afghanistan also 
provided opportunities to visit sites that held a special place in Tajik his-
tory and culture. As one translator remarked about a visit he paid to Herat:
Herat […] is one of the centres of scholarship and literature – Persian-Tajik 
scholarship and literature. Abd ar-Rahman Jami, a great poet, lived there. A 
Persian-Tajik poet. His pupil was Mir Ali-Shir Navai, the founder of Uzbek 
literature […]. We wanted to see the mausoleum where the two poets were 
burТОН. But tСОв НТНn’t lОt us, bОcausО tСОв аОrО irТng from botС sТНОs, 
аТtС macСТnО guns, rТlОs, Оtc. So tСТs аas HОrat. It аas Тn summОr [...]. 
There were cherries, grapes. It was like a second paradise. It was one of the 




Little comprehensive information has been unearthed about the educa-
tional backgrounds of the Soviet civilians in Afghanistan. Evidence from 
interviews and newspapers, however, suggests that many of them had com-
pleted degrees in oriental languages, including Persian and Pashto, prior 
to their postings, either in Tajikistan or elsewhere in the Soviet Union. 
Indeed, a number had been employed as academic staff, researching 
Persian language and literature in institutes of higher education. But even 
those who already had a strong command of Persian before their departure 
oftОn founН opportunТtТОs to НОvОlop tСОТr proicТОncв Тn AfgСanТstan.
A number of things set Tajik and Dari (the Afghan variant of Persian) 
apart. One was the difference in specialised terminologies. Several res-
pondents reported having been introduced in Afghanistan to vocabularies 
not in common usage in the Soviet Union. This seems to have been par-
ticularly true for technical terminologies, which in Soviet Tajik had been 
replaced with Russicisms in many cases. The aforementioned translator 
аСo СaН аorkОН at tСО MТnТstrв of JustТcО rОcallОН tСО НТficultТОs СО СaН 
experienced when translating legal documents in his early months. He 
remembered struggling with words that were derived from Arabic, French 




For many translators, the Afghan War was a time of language immer-
sТon. Manв of tСОm rОturnОН to TajТkТstan аТtС a irmОr commanН of аorНs 
and grammatical forms that had largely disappeared from their own tongue. 
It seems that at least a number of them resumed previous jobs at institutes 
of higher education – or else took up new positions in academia, media and 
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the arts. The translator at the Ministry of Transport in Kabul, for example, 
returned to his old position at the Tajik State University, while the trans-
lator who had been posted to the Ministry of Justice found a new job at 
the Pedagogical Institute in Dushanbe. The former Komsomol interpreter, 
NaНžmТННТn Šoinbodov, in turn, began to make a name for himself as a 
journalist and political satirist. Other ex-interpreters, too – both civilian 
and military ones – also founН аork Тn mОНТa. TСОsО ТncluНОН MaСmaНalī 
Hait, who began to work as a journalist attached to the television and radio 
committee (Hait, 2013, interview) and a former interpreter from Khorugh 
who resumed his work with the local Khorugh TV station after a six-month 
tour in Afghanistan (Anonymous
5
, 2013, Interview).
There seems to have been a pattern of former interpreters and advisers 
establishing themselves in media, culture and academia after their time 
in Afghanistan. Thereby, they gained a platform from which they were 
able to join discussions that were taking shape in the republic at this time, 
particularly on the topic of language and cultural revival. It seems that a 
number of the former interpreters and advisers became convinced that Dari 
represented a more authentic form of Persian and began deliberately to 
deploy in their writings words and structures used in Afghanistan. As said 
one former interpreter who today works at the Institute of Oriental Studies 
in Dushanbe:
The new terms and the new words that were in Russian here were replaced. 
They were replaced with Afghan ones. For instance, the word komanda 
(team) […] is not a Tajik word. It should be dasta. So there were [efforts] 
particularly in the press, in newspapers, on radio and TV. There, there were 
НОinТtОlв largО cСangОs. WСОn tСО laНs arrТvОН tСОв rОalТsОН tСat AfgСan 




While such altering of Tajik was not necessarily part of a broader poli-
tical programme, many of the former interpreters and advisers do appear to 
have been motivated by a belief that their national tongue had been unduly 
ТnluОncОН bв RussТan. As tСО Об-ТntОrprОtОr at tСО AcaНОmв of ScТОncОs 
said:
[The former interpreters and advisors] wanted to simplify the Tajik language, 
so that it would become purer than before. So that there would be fewer 
Russian words, fewer foreign words. So that there would be more Tajik 




The move to revitalise the Tajik language can be seen as part of a 
growing resistance to Russian cultural domination. It is also noteworthy 
that the efforts took place in a context where Tajikistan was increasingly 
opОnТng up to ТnluОncОs from otСОr parts of tСО PОrsТanatО аorlН. TСО 
movО toаarНs languagО rОform rОlОctОН Moscoа’s НОclТnТng cultural 
sway over the Southern republic.
Other former participants of the Afghan War took a more vigorous 
lОap Тnto polТtТcs. MТrbobo MТrraСТm anН ToСrТr AbНuНžabbor, botС for-
mer advisers, played instrumental roles in the formation of the nationalist 
Rastokhez movement, which counted within its ranks numerous other 
Dushanbe intellectuals (Nourzhanov & Bleuer, 2013, p. 196). Ahmadšo 
Komilov, later the director of the Tajik television studio during the short-li-
ved coalition government in 1992, also played a prominent role in this 
period as an advocate of cultural and political reform (Sajfullaev, 2013; 
Hait, 2013, interview).
AnotСОr notablО igurО Тn tСО movОmОnt for languagО rОvТval аas 
Hamza Kamol, a researcher at the Institute of Culture and Languages at the 
Academy of Sciences, who worked as a senior adviser in Kabul between 
1984 and 1989. By his own account, he advised two Afghan pdpa30 general 
secretaries, Babrak Karmal and Mohammad Najibullah, as well as nume-
rous otСОr sОnТor oficТals. In an ТntОrvТОа Тn FОbruarв 2014, СО rОmОmbО-
red having been impressed by what he saw as the political sophistication 
of СТs ТntОrlocutors Тn AfgСanТstan anН tСО lourТsСТng of PОrsТan languagО 
and culture. In his own words, his time in Afghanistan hade led him to 
realise that:
It is possible to govern a state with the Persian language. Then we thought, 
аСв Тs our rОpublТc callОН tСО RОpublТc of TajТkТstan? BОcausО maТnlв TajТks 
live there. But back then more than 50% of Dushanbe were Russian-speakers. 
If there were 500,000, then around 250,000 were Russian-speakers […]. So 
when we went to Afghanistan and saw that Tajiks can govern, Tajiks can 
be at the top. There were these questions. Then they accused us of being 
natТonalТsts. WСat Нo tСОв mОan natТonalТsts? WО’rО for tСО pОoplО! WО аant 
more to be written in Tajik. We want all meetings, for example the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan, to be held in Tajik. Then 
they labelled us as ‘nationalists’ (Kamol, 2014, interview).
30 The People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the pro-Soviet ruling party of Afghanistan 
between 1978 and 1992.
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MaСmaНalī HaТt аas anotСОr promТnОnt opposТtТonТst Тn tСТs pОrТoН. HО 
was a graduate of Leningrad State University and served in Afghanistan 
as an ТntОllТgОncО oficОr anН ТntОrprОtОr аТtС tСО gru. After his return 
to Tajikistan, he joined Rastokhez, soon becoming its general secretary 
and deputy leader. He remained in the organisation for a few years but 
eventually left it in 1992, when he instead joined the Islamic Party of 
Renaissance, where he stayed until its closure by the Tajik government 
Тn 2015. DurТng tСО cТvТl аar (1992-1997), СО аas a sОnТor oficТal of tСО 
United Tajik Opposition, the umbrella body that represented the Tajik 
opposition in its negotiations with the Tajik government. Although Hait 
links his own activism to violence he saw perpetrated against Afghans and 
the torture he suffered after being accused of double dealings by the kgb, 
he noted in an interview that many of the others who pushed for cultural, 
linguistic and religious revival in Tajikistan had worked as advisers and 
interpreters in Afghanistan:
Some of those who worked in state institutions, and particularly in the huma-
nities, in the Republic of Afghanistan – in different academies, institutes and 
universities in Afghanistan, or also as interpreters – they later became natio-
nalists in Tajikistan. They supported the revival of the Tajik language, the 
revival of Tajik culture and the revival of the Islamic religion in Tajikistan. 
For ОбamplО, ToСrТr AbНuНžabbor, MТrbobo MТrraСТm anН manв otСОrs sup-
ported this. Ahmadšo Komilov. Many others played a leading role in the 
passing of the Law on Language and in the movement for the independence 
of our republic. We fought for the independence of our state, and for our 
language (Hait, 2013, interview).
What then emerges is a picture of former translators and advisers contri-
buting to the movement for linguistic and cultural revival in Tajikistan in 
a number of different ways. While some took leading roles in the opposi-
tion movement, gravitating towards organisations such as Ru Ba Ru and 
Rastokhez, others helped to push for the revitalisation of the Tajik lan-
guage in more subtle ways, using their positions as scholars, journalists 
and writers to gradually introduce into public usage Tajik words, phrases 
and grammatical structures drawn from Dari. In both cases, the expe-




Some Western observers have viewed the Afghan War as an anvil of 
nationalist and religious fervour in Tajikistan. Yet the effects of the war 
on the Central Asian republic were far more complex. While a number 
of former participants did adopt a more critical view of Russian cultural 
and political domination in Tajikistan, others seem to have become more 
deeply invested in the established order, even to the point of rallying to its 
defences during the disturbances of the early 1990s.
One explanation for the divergence can be found in the contrasting 
experiences of those individuals who went to Afghanistan in a military 
capacТtв anН tСosО аСo travОllОН tСОrО to fulil a prОНomТnantlв mТlТtarв 
functТon. WСТlО solНТОrs anН oficОrs аОrО Тn gОnОral morО ОбposОН to vТo-
lence and were also subjected to the tough discipline and authoritarianism 
of the Soviet military, civilian translators and advisers tended to experience 
the war at some distance from the battlelines and were at greater liberty 
to socialise with Afghans. Importantly, many translators and interpreters 
camО back from tСО conlТct аТtС a irmОr commanН of DarТ, СavТng mastО-
rОН Тts spОcТicТtТОs Тn tСОТr lТnО of аork. TСТs аas to bОcomО sТgnТicant Тn 
their later efforts to reform the Tajik variant of Persian.
Yet it is important also to look at developments after the return of the 
participants to the Soviet Union. Importantly, many of the civilian wor-
kers came to take up positions in media, academia and the arts, acquiring 
a platform from which they could join in growing discussions on culture 
and language. While the movement for national revival, which gathered 
force in the late 1980s, drew inspiration from similar efforts in other 
parts of the Soviet Union (not least in the Baltic republics), an important 
impulse seems to have come from the former interpreters and advisers 
who had worked and served in Afghanistan. Some of them, like Mirbobo 
MТrraСТm anН ToСrТr AbНuНžabbor, took opОnlв polТtТcal stancОs, aНvo-
cating for broader political change. Others, however, contributed to the 
movement for culture change through more subtle efforts to alter the 
public usage of Tajik.
For their part, the former conscripts were quickly coopted into institu-
tions that had a history of organising World War II veterans and which saw 
Тn tСО nОа gОnОratТon of igСtОrs anotСОr assОt for tСО mТlТtarв anН patrТotТc 
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education of the Soviet youth. Offering the veterans material and moral 
support, tСОв also НОmanНОН tСat tСО formОr igСtОrs takО part Тn Оfforts 
to promote an ideological programme. The rhetoric of patriotism became 
the language through which the relationship between the veterans and the 
authorities was mediated. Even some disgruntled veterans came to accept 
that language as the surest means for winning the ear of the authorities 
while helping to boost the prestige of Afghan War veterans in the eyes of 
the public. Thus a symbiotic relationship between the veterans movement 
and the state authorities emerged, predicated both on the ability of the 
authorities to grant the afgancв support anН on tСО vОtОrans’ ТНОntТicatТon 
with the state on whose behalf they had shed blood in Afghanistan.31
So, the Afghan War did factor into some of the political discussions that 
were gathering force in Tajikistan in the late 1980s. Yet, it did so in ways 
that were multifaceted and even contradictory. As has been shown, both 
the defenders and the challengers of the political status quo were able to 
draw on their experiences in Afghanistan, contributing to trends that were 
both conservative and subversive. Far from being a moment of political or 
religious awakening, the war, therefore, had a more complex set of effects 
on the Central Asian republic, feeding into and amplifying trends that were 
already underway in these closing years of Soviet power.
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Abstract
FormОr partТcТpants of tСО SovТОt-AfgСan War (1979-1989) plaвОН a sТgnТicant 
role in political developments in Tajikistan in the perestroika period yet they did 
so in markedly different ways. While some aligned themselves with established 
power, supporting propaganda drives and presenting themselves as loyal soldiers 
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of the Soviet regime, others became active participants in the movement for cul-
tural and linguistic revival, even to the point of founding and joining opposition 
groups. The paper argues that far from dealing a shock to the political system in 
Tajikistan, the Afghan War had both conservative and subversive effects on polit-
ical discussions in this period.
Keywords: Soviet-Afghan War, afgancв, Afghan War veterans, interpreters, mili-
tary-patriotic education, political mobilisation.
Résumé
Le Tadjikistan et l’impact ambigu de la guerre soviцtique d’Afghanistan. 
La mobilisation politique d’anciens participants à la guerre soviétique 
d’Afghanistan en 1989.
Les anciens participants à la guerre soviétique d’Afghanistan ont joué un rôle à la 
fois important et varié sur les événements politiques au Tadjikistan au cours de la 
perestroïka. Tandis que certains d’entre eux ont suivi le pouvoir en place, en parti-
cipant à des campagnes de propagande et en se présentant comme des soldats dé-
voués au régime soviétique, d’autres se sont activement mobilisés dans le mouve-
ment pour la renaissance linguistique et culturelle, au point de fonder ou rejoindre 
НОs groupОs Н’opposТtТon natТonalО. CОt artТclО afirmО quО la guОrrО sovТцtТquО 
d’Afghanistan n’a pas été un simple choc pour le système politique du Tadjikistan. 
Elle a eu des effets à la fois conservateurs et subversifs sur le débat politique.
Mots clés : guerre soviétique d’Afghanistan, afgancв, anciens combattants, 
vétérans soviétiques d’Afghanistan, interprètes, éducation militaire patriotique, 
mobilisation politique.
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